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NOTE
INFUSING DUE PROCESS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF
LEGALITY INTO CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS BEFORE
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA
Gwendolyn Stamper*
Contempt proceedings before the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda suffer from two procedural defects: the hearings run
afoul of the principle of legality and fail to afford calibrated proce-
dural protection for accused contemnors. First, this Note contends
that these two tribunals properly rely on their inherent powers to
codify procedural rules for contempt proceedings. However the tri-
bunals' inherent power to prosecute contempt does not allow the
courts to punish contemptuous conduct that has not been explicitly
proscribed. Such a prosecution contravenes the principle of legality,
which provides that criminal responsibility may attach to conduct
only when there is a known preexisting prohibition of that behavior
Second, this Note claims that while the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda may promulgate procedural rules governing
contempt hearings, they are not empowered to create criminal con-
tempt laws. Even though contempt proceedings before the tribunals
are ostensibly noncriminal, they may be functionally criminal be-
cause they can impose substantial penalties. Whether criminal or
noncriminal, because the proceedings may lead to severe sanctions,
they lack the appropriate procedural protections that should ac-
company potential property and liberty deprivations.
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INTRODUCTION
In response to two sets of atrocities perpetrated during the 1990s, the
crimes against humanity executed in the former Yugoslavia and the genocide
committed in Rwanda, the United Nations ("UN") established the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR") (together, "the Tribu-
nals").' The Tribunals dramatically accelerated the maturation of the
international criminal law regime, the body of law that imposes criminal
responsibility on individuals and punishes abuses through international
courts. As a result, the Tribunals have clarified the substantive law prohibit-
ing crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, and they
have done much to develop the principles and procedures governing the in-
vestigation and prosecution of these crimes.' Nonetheless, because the
procedural principles guiding the Tribunals were adopted as experimental,4
they remain relatively embryonic and unpredictable across a number of key
areas, perhaps most notably in the treatment of contempt of court.'
1. ROBERT CRYER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE 102 (2007).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 103.
4. See Rep. of the Int'l Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of Int'l Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since
1991, $ 54, U.N. Doc. A/49/342 (Aug. 29, 1994) ("As a body of a unique character in international
law, the Tribunal has had little by way of precedent to guide it."). Because the rules of procedure
from the two preceding international criminal tribunals, the Nuremburg and Tokyo tribunals, pos-
sessed only eleven and nine procedural rules respectively, the ICTY was left to resolve all other
matters on a case-by-case basis. Id.
5. See, e.g., Michble Buteau & Gabriel Oosthuizen, When the Statute and Rules are Silent:
The Inherent Powers of the Tribunal, in ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR
OF GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD 65, 65 (Richard May et al. eds., 2001) (stating that the ICTY has a
rudimentary procedural structure); Christopher Gane, Commentary, Contempt and the ICTY, in 5
ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS. THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 2000-2001, at 236, 239 (Andrd Klip & Goran
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Like any court, the ICTY and ICTR must preserve the integrity of their
proceedings to ensure the fair and effective administration of justice.6 It is
especially important that the Tribunals develop a robust process for adjudi-
cating the improprieties that occur inside and outside their courtrooms
because they have been historically subject to pervasive allegations of foul
play, with claims ranging from general misconduct to institutionalized brib-
ery.t Such accusations have led the Tribunals to function under a shadow of
impropriety, eroding their legitimacy9 and imperiling their basic operation.'o
During the past two years, the ICTY has more vigorously responded to such
accusations of misconduct by prosecuting and punishing a defendant" and
former ICTY employeel2 for the willful disclosure of confidential informa-
tion.
As the Tribunals continue to prosecute and punish contempt, it is of vital
importance that they employ a vigorous, principled process for the investi-
gation and prosecution of contempt allegations. Contempt proceedings
before the Tribunals suffer from incomplete adherence to the principle of
Sluiter eds., 2003) (describing the ICTY's contempt jurisdiction as theoretically expansive but prac-
tically underdeveloped, leading to procedural ambiguities); A.G. O'Shea, Comment, Changing the
rules of the game in the middle of play: the dilemma of procedural development in the Rwanda
Tribunal, 14 S. AFR. J. CRIM. JUST. 233 (2001) (explaining that the ICTY and the ICTR have rapidly
created and amended their rules of procedure and have improperly applied the new rules retrospec-
tively).
6. Gdran Sluiter, The ICTY and Offences against the Administration of Justice, 2 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 631, 631 (2004).
7. Allegations of corruption and mismanagement within the ICTR led to a scathing 1997
report by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services, which cited widespread bureaucratic incom-
petence, improper hiring and promotion schemes, and the suspicious loss of ICTR petty cash. Rep.
of the Office of Internal Oversight Servs. on the audit & investigation of the Int'l Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda, U.N. Doe. A/51/789 (Feb. 6, 1997) [hereinafter 1997 OIOS ICTR Report].
8. In the 1990s, the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services identified the practice of fee-
sharing arrangements, an institutionalized form of bribery, in both the ICTR and the ICTY Rep. of
the Office of Internal Oversight Servs. on the investigation into possible fee-splitting arrangements
between defence counsel and indigent detainees at the Int'l Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the
Int'l Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 20, U.N. Doc. A/55/759 (Feb. 1, 2001).
9. The practice of fee-sharing not only diverts UN funds to suspected war criminals but also
undermines the administration of justice by raising suspicion and disapproval of the mechanics of
the Tribunals. 1997 OIOS ICTR Report, supra note 7.
10. See Int'l Crisis Grp. [ICGI, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Justice De-
layed, at iii, ICG Africa Report N. 30 (June 7, 2001) (describing how bureaucratic dysfunction has
prevented the tribunal from carrying out its mandate and how the majority of Rwandans view the
court as a "useless institution").
11. On July 24, 2009, the ICTY Trial Chamber found Vojislav Regelj guilty of contempt for
the knowing disclosure of confidential information regarding protected witnesses. See Prosecutor v.
Regelj, Case No. IT-03-67-R77.2, Decision on Allegations of Contempt (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Jan. 21, 2009). The Appeals Chamber affirmed the contempt conviction on May
19, 2010. Case Against Vojislav Segelj, Case No. IT-03-67-R77.2-A, Judgement (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia May 19, 2010).
12. On September 14, 2009, the ICTY Trial Chamber found Florence Hartmann, a former
spokesperson for the ICTY Office of the Prosecutor, guilty of contempt for "knowingly and willfully
interfering with the administration of justice" by revealing the confidential contents of Appeals
Chamber orders in her 2007 book. Case Against Florence Hartmann, Case No. IT-02-54-R77.5,
Judgement on Allegations of Contempt, 2 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 14,
2009).
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legality, which in practice means that a potential contemnor may be pun-
ished for conduct that was not prospectively proscribed. For example, the
ICTY Appeals Chamber prosecuted and punished defense counsel Milan
Vujin for contemptuous conduct even though the bench acknowledged that
Vujin's conduct was not expressly banned.13 The Tribunals also provide de-
ficient procedural protections for accused contemnors, such as permitting
contempt trials in absentia, despite the substantial liberty and property dep-
rivations faced by the accused contemnors.
This Note argues that the statutory overlay and the inherent powers of
the Tribunals empower the judges to codify procedural rules governing con-
tempt proceedings but do not permit the judges to adjudicate noncodified
contempt offenses or to create new criminal offenses. This Note also sug-
gests that the balancing test in Mathews v. Eldridge'- could be a viable
alternative for establishing due process in the Tribunals' contempt proceed-
ings. Part I outlines the statutory framework animating the Tribunals'
contempt power. Part II describes the second central source of authority for
prosecuting contempt, the inherent-powers doctrine. Part III explains why
the principle of legality 6 prevents the Tribunals' judges from employing
their inherent powers to prosecute conduct that is not explicitly prohibited.
Finally, Part IV articulates why the Tribunals' constitutive documents forbid
the judges from employing their inherent powers to legislate criminal con-
tempt laws. Part IV also illustrates that the procedural emphasis on the
binary classification of criminal and noncriminal contempt proceedings al-
lows for the underenforcement of procedural protections in non-criminal
contempt proceedings. To ensure that accused contemnors receive basic
procedural protection, Part IV proposes that the Tribunals apply the El-
dridge test to determine which procedural rights should be afforded to each
accused contemnor.
13. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A-R77, Judgment on Allegations of Contempt
Against Prior Council, Milan Vujin, 13 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 31, 2000).
14. See Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-AR1O8 bis, Judgement on the Request of
the Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber H of 18 July 1997, 59 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 29, 1997).
15. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See infra Part IV for a discussion of the process that is due to ac-
cused contemnors.
16. The principle of legality, or nullum crimen sine lege, states that criminal responsibility
may only be based on preexisting prohibitions of behavior that are understood to hold criminal
consequences. CRYER ET AL., supra note 1, at 13.
1554 [Vol. 109:1551
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I. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK FOR PROSECUTING CONTEMPT
IN THE TRIBUNALS
The ICTY and ICTR Statutes," established by the UN Security Council,
enable the Tribunals to promulgate their own rules of procedure and evi-
dence ("RPE"). " Under Article 1 of the ICTY Statute, the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal is limited to the prosecution of the serious violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law that were committed in the former Yugoslavia since
1991, 19 suggesting the judges lack jurisdiction over contempt allegations.
However, Article 15 of the ICTY Statute delegates authority to the judges of
the tribunal to enact the RPE.2 0 Additionally, Article 20 empowers the judges
to "ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and that proceedings are con-
ducted .. . [to allow for the] full respect for the rights of the accused and
due regard for the protection of victims and witnesses." 2' Therefore, while
the ICTY Statute does not explicitly grant jurisdiction over contempt pro-
ceedings to the ICTY, it does empower the tribunal to promulgate
procedural rules governing a broad range of conduct, including "appropriate
matters" before the tribunal, and to take action to ensure that the proceed-
ings are efficient and fair.
Likewise, Article 15 of the ICTR Statute empowers the judges with the
same authority to promulgate RPE. Even though Article 1 limits the juris-
dictional mandate of the ICTR to prosecuting "serious violations of
international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and
Rwandan citizens responsible for such violations committed in the territory
of neighbouring States between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994,",22
17. The UN Security Council enacted the ICTR Statute one year after the adoption of the
ICTY Statute. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, enacted Nov. 8, 1994
[hereinafter ICTR Statute], available at http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/EnglishlLegal/Statute/
2010.pdf; Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
enacted May 25, 1993 [hereinafter ICTY Statute], available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/
Legal%20Library/Statute/statute-sept09_en.pdf. The ICTY Statute was enacted on May 25, 1993.
S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) (adopting Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia). The ICTR Statute was enacted on November 8, 1994. S.C. Res.
955, U.N. Doc. SIRES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (adopting Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda).
18. Int'l Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of Int'l
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991, Rules of Proce-
dure and Evidence, U.N Doc. IT/32/Rev. 45 (Dec. 8, 2010) [hereinafter ICTY RPE]; Int'l Criminal
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide & other Serious Violations of
Int'l Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda & Rwandan citizens responsible for
Genocide & other such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring States, Rules of Proce-
dure and Evidence (Feb. 9, 2010) [hereinafter ICTR RPE], available at http://www.unictr.org/
Portals/O/EnglishlLegal/ROP/100209.pdf.
19. ICTY Statute, supra note 17, art. 1, at 5; see also Sluiter, supra note 6, at 632.
20. ICTY Statute, supra note 17, art. 15, at 10 ("The judges of the International Tribunal
shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence for the conduct of the pre-trial phase of the proceedings,
trials and appeals, the admission of evidence, the protection of victims and witnesses and other
appropriate matters.").
21. Id. art. 20, at 20.
22. ICTR Statute, supra note 17, art. 14, at 59.
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Article 14 enables the ICTR judges to promulgate RPE for a wide range of
procedural matters.23
The Security Council provided that the Tribunals would share governing
principles and constitutive architecture in two primary ways. First, with a
few exceptions, the RPE of the ICTY and ICTR are identical.24 The Security
Council stipulated that the Tribunals would share procedural and evidentiary
rules, and Article 14 of the ICTR Statute provides that the ICTR RPE be
patterned after the ICTY RPE. However, the Security Council ensured that
the ICTR judges have authority to amend the RPE as necessary.
Second, the Security Council connected the Tribunals by providing that
the ICTR would share the ICTY Appeals Chamber. 1 Initially, the Appeals
Chamber, which sits in The Hague, was composed entirely of ICTY
28 29judges. However, after the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1329,
two judges from the ICTR are permanently assigned to sit on the Appeals
Chamber in The Hague.30 The shared Appeals Chamber ensures that the Tri-
bunals do not exercise conflicting jurisprudential approaches.'
The procedural rules may be modified through a process outlined in
RPE Rule 6(A), which states that the prosecutor, any judge, or the registrar
may offer proposals for revisions.32 The original ICTY RPE was adopted on
23. Id. art. 14, at 71 .
24. Daryl A. Mundis, The Legal Character and Status of the Rules of Procedure and Evi-
dence of the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals, 1 INT'L CRIM. L. REV. 191, 193 (2001).
25. ICTR Statute, supra note 17, art. 14, at 71 ("The Judges of the International Tribunal for
Rwanda shall adopt [the procedural rules] of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
with such changes as they deem necessary.").
26. S.C. Res. 955, Annex, art. 12(2), U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
27. The ICTY is located in The Hague, the Netherlands while the ICTR is seated in Arusha,
Tanzania. About the ICTY, UNITED NATIONS INT'L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR FORMER YUGOSLAVIA,
http://www.icty.org/sections/AbouttheICTY (last visited Mar. 20, 2011); General Information, INT'L
CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, http://www.unictr.org/AboutICTR/Generallnformation/tabid/101/
Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 20, 2011).
28. Article 12(2) of the ICTR Statute previously articulated that the members of the ICTY
Appeals Chamber would serve as the members of the ICTR Appeals Chamber. S.C. Res. 955, supra
note 26, art. 12(2).
29. S.C. Res. 1329, U.N. Doc S/RES/1329 (Dec. 5, 2000). Resolution 1329 was incorporated
into the ICTR Statute under Article 13. See ICTR Statute, supra note 17, art. 13, at 71.
30. ICTR Statute, supra note 17, art. 13, at 71.
31. It is formally unresolved if decisions of the ICTY Appeals Chamber are binding on the
ICTR and vice versa, although for all practical purposes, Appeals Chamber judgments are binding
on the Trial Courts. See, e.g., ClARA DAMGAARD, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR
CORE INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 53 (2008).
32. ICTY RPE, supra note 18, r. 6(A), at 5. ICTY RPE Rule 6(C) also stipulates that the
president of the tribunal may propose amendments consistent with the Practice Direction, which the
president promulgated in 1998. Id. r. 6(C), at 5; see also President of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Practice Direction on Procedure for the Proposal, Consideration
of and Publication of Amendments to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International
Tribunal, U.N. Doc. IT/143 (Dec. 18, 1998). Amendments are adopted if a minimum of ten judges
vote for the amendment during a plenary meeting. ICTY RPE, supra note 18, r. 6(A), at 5. If the
judges unanimously agree on an amendment proposal, the RPE may also be revised outside of the
plenary process. Id. r. 6(B), at 5.
1556 [ Vol. I109: 155 1
February 11, 199413 and has been revised or amended by the judges forty-
five times.34 Since the establishment of the ICTR RPE on June 29, 1995, it
has been revised or amended twenty-seven times."
The frequent revisions to the Tribunals' RPEs have led to concerns re-
garding the Tribunals' compliance with the principle of legality because
revised RPEs have occasionally been applied retroactively. Typically, the
retroactive application of altered procedural rules does not implicate the
principle of legality because the principle is concerned with substantive
criminal prohibitions rather than procedural rules. However, because the
contempt rules are contained in the RPE, changes to the contempt rules are
substantive and if applied retroactively impinge upon the principle of legal-
ity. To avoid encroaching on the principle of legality, ICTY RPE Rule 6(D)
makes clear that while amendments are to take effect seven days after the
issuance of an official tribunal publication, the modified rules shall not op-
erate to injure or prejudice the rights of the accused in any pending case.
As discussed in Part 1II, critics have contested the extent to which judges
have effectively implemented the mandate of Rule 6(D); these concerns
about retroactive implementation of revisions to the rules have clouded the
legitimacy of contempt hearings before the Tribunals.38
A second source of controversy centers on the fact that the ICTR and
ICTY Statutes are silent on the matter of prosecuting and punishing con-
tempt." Article 15 of the ICTY Statute permits the promulgation of
procedural rules over "appropriate matters," which arguably include con-
tempt. 0 However, the power to create rules does not typically confer the
41power to prosecute and punish infractions of those rules. Consequently, a
number of critics have argued that the Tribunals' prosecution and punish-
ment of contempt may be an ultra vires exercise of power.42
The Tribunals' judges have concluded that they are empowered to prom-
ulgate contempt rules under Article 15 of the ICTY Statute and are granted
33. Mundis, supra note 24, at 192.
34. See Rules of Procedure and Evidence, UNITED NATIONS INT'L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty.org/sid/136 (last visited Mar. 20, 2011) (providing copies of
each revision). On the date when this Note was completed, Revision 45 of the ICTY RPE was in
effect. See id.
35. See Rules of Procedure and Evidence, INT'L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, http://
www.unictr.org/Legal/RulesofProcedureandEvidence/tabid/95/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 20,
2011) (providing copies of each revision).
36. See infra Part UI; see also O'Shea, supra note 5.
37. ICTY RPE, supra note 18, r. 6(D), at 5.
38. See, e.g., O'Shea, supra note 5 (explaining that the frequent amendment of the Tribunals'
rules abuses the procedural rights of defendants); see also Part Il.
39. See CRYER ET AL., supra note 1, at 391.
40. ICTY Statute, supra note 17, art. 15, at 10.
41. See Michael Bohlander, International Criminal Tribunals and Their Power to Punish
Contempt and False Testimony, 12 CRIM. L.F. 91, 92 (2001).
42. See, e.g., id. at 117; Andr6 Klip, Witnesses before the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia, 67 INT'L REv. PENAL L. 267, 276-77 (1996).
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the authority to adjudicate and punish violations of these rules as a function
of their inherent powers-the power derived from the judicial functions of
the Tribunals.43 Accordingly, when the original ICTY RPE was adopted in
February 1994, Rule 77 empowered the tribunal to fine or imprison contu-
macious witnesses." ICTY RPE Rule 77, entitled "Contempt of the
Tribunal," now defines contempt and provides the power to punish the of-
fense:
(A) The Tribunal in the exercise of its inherent power may hold in contempt
those who knowingly and wilfully interfere with its administration of
justice, including any person who
(i) being a witness before a Chamber, contumaciously refuses or fails
to answer a question;
(ii) discloses information relating to those proceedings in knowing
violation of an order of a Chamber;
(iii) without just excuse fails to comply with an order to attend before
or produce documents before a Chamber;
(iv) threatens, intimidates, causes any injury or offers a bribe to, or oth-
erwise interferes with, a witness who is giving, has given, or is
about to give evidence in proceedings before a Chamber, or a po-
tential witness; or
(v) threatens, intimidates, offers a bribe to, or otherwise seeks to co-
erce any other person, with the intention of preventing that other
person from complying with an obligation under an order of a
Judge or Chamber ....
(G) The maximum penalty that may be imposed on a person found to be in
contempt of the Tribunal shall be a term of imprisonment not exceeding
seven years, or a fine not exceeding 100,000 Euros, or both.4 5
Following the procedures outlined in Rule 6, the ICTY judges have
46
amended Rule 77 ten times, and the ICTR judges have revised Rule 77
43. E.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A-AR77, Appeal Judgement on Allegations
of Contempt Against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin, at 4 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Feb. 27, 2001); see also CRYER ET AL., supra note 1, at 391; Mundis, supra note 24, at 219.
44. Int'l Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of Int'l
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia since 1991, Rules of Procedure
and Evidence, r. 77, at 42-43, U.N Doc. IT/32 (Mar. 14, 1994) ("[A] witness who refuses or fails
contumaciously to answer a question relevant to the issue before a Chamber may be found in con-
tempt of the Tribunal. The Chamber may impose a fine . .. or a term of imprisonment .... ).
45. ICTY RPE, supra note 18, r. 77, at 80-82 (amendment dates omitted). ICTR RPE Rule
77 is identical with the exception of subpart (G), which states, "The maximum penalty that may be
imposed on a person found to be in contempt of the Tribunal shall be a term of imprisonment not
exceeding five years, or a fine not exceeding USDIO,000, or both." ICTR RPE, supra note 18, r.
77(G), at 93.
46. See Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 34. ICTY RPE Rule 77 was amended
or revised on January 30, 1995; July 25, 1997; November 12, 1997; July 10, 1998; December 4,
1558 [Vol. 109:1551
twice.47 Notably, in November 1997, the ICTY's Rule 77 was amended to
clarify that "[n]othing in this Rule affects the inherent power of the Tribunal
to hold in contempt those who knowingly and wilfully interfere with its ad-
ministration of justice."'4 The ICTR judges similarly amended Rule 77 to
49include language regarding the tribunal's inherent powers.
11. THE INHERENT-POWERs DOCTRINE AS A BASIS FOR PROMULGATING
PROCEDURAL RULES GOVERNING CONTEMPT
This Part considers whether the Tribunals possess the power to promul-
gate procedural rules, outside the power recognized in Rule 77, governing
contempt proceedings and to prosecute infractions under these rules. If so,
an ancillary question is whether the Tribunals' judges are competent to de-
fine the scope of this inherent power. This Part discusses the source,
development, and current application of the inherent-powers doctrine before
the ICTY and ICTR; it concludes that the Tribunals possess the power to
create procedural rules pursuant to Article 15 of the ICTY and ICTR Stat-
utes and to adjudicate violations of such rules. Although the ICTY has
interpreted the scope of its inherent powers more broadly than the ICTR and
has offered inconsistent explanations for the source of the powers, this Part
also endorses the competency of the Tribunals to employ and appropriately
circumscribe their inherent powers to promulgate procedural rules and pros-
ecute unambiguous infractions.
The inherent-powers doctrine flows from the idea that a court is vested
with an inherent power to address certain issues as a result of the court's
"very creation."" While controversial in the scope of its application, the
power is recognized in both domestic courts throughout the world and inter-
national courts.5 2 The U.S. Supreme Court has "firmly established that [t]he
power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts."" The Court clarified
1998; December 1, 2000; December 13, 2000; December 13, 2001; July 12, 2002; and July 22,
2009. See id.
47. See Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 35. ICTR RPE Rule 77 was amended
or revised on May 27, 2003 and November 10, 2006. See id.
48. Int'l Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of Int'l
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia since 1991, Rules of Procedure
and Evidence, r. 77(F), at 56, U.N Doc. IT/32/Rev. 12 (Nov. 12, 1997) [hereinafter ICTY RPE as
Amended Nov. 12, 1997].
49. See Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 35 (locate "May 27, 2003"; then click
"RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE") (indicating this amendment to Rule 77 occurred on
May 27, 2003).
50. Mundis, supra note 24, at 216.
51. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S.
(6 Wheat.) 204, 227 (1821)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
52. See, e.g., 2 B.E. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE § 173 (5th ed. 2008).
53. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44 (alteration in original) (quoting Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S.
(19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1873)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining that inherent powers are
not controlled by statute or rules and that any statutory attempt to diminish these powers would be
deemed ineffective).
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that the power is expansive, covering conduct inside and outside the con-
fines of the courtroom, because "[t]he underlying concern that gave rise to
the contempt power was not .. . merely the disruption of court proceedings.
Rather, it was disobedience to the orders of the Judiciary, regardless of
whether such disobedience interfered with the conduct of trial."5 4 The Inter-
national Court of Justice ("ICJ") similarly adopted an expansive
interpretation of the power in the Nuclear Tests case, where the ICJ stated
that it possessed an inherent power "to take such action as may be required
to provide for the orderly settlement of all matters in dispute."55
While a number of international courts rely on their inherent powers to
justify the exertion of judicial powers not expressly conferred by their con-
stitutive instruments, these courts rarely explain the basis of their authority
to do so. Consequently, there is not a fully developed theory on the limits of
its application.
The seminal case that explored and established inherent powers in inter-
national criminal tribunals was Prosecutor v. Tadic in August 1995, the first
case to come before the ICTY" In response to a claim by the defense that
questioned the legality of the establishment of the Tribunal, the Trial Cham-
ber responded that it could not scrutinize the actions of the UN organs that
created it because its jurisdictional power was limited to Article I of the
ICTY Statute, which provided the "full extent" of the court's power.59 How-
ever, the Tadic Appeals Chamber rejected this limited conception of the
court's jurisdictioni 0 It distinguished "primary" or "original" jurisdiction,
which the trial court considered to be the full extent of the Tribunal's com-
petence, from "inherent" jurisdiction.6' The Appeals Chamber explained that
inherent jurisdiction is a "residual power[] which may derive from the re-
quirements of the 'judicial function' itself' 62 and continued that a court's
"jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction" is a critical component in the
54. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481
U.S. 787, 798 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
55. Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 23 (Dec. 20).
56. Paola Gaeta, Inherent Powers of International Courts and Tribunals, in MAN'S INHU-
MANITY TO MAN: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOUR OF ANTONIO CASSESE 353, 356 (Lal
Chand Vohrah et al. eds., 2003) (describing the use of inherent powers by a number of regional
human rights courts, international criminal tribunals, and international arbitral tribunals).
57. See Chester Brown, The Inherent Powers of International Courts and Tribunals, 2005
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 195, 199.
58. Buteau & Oosthuizen, supra note 5, at 66.
59. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdic-
tion, 11[5, 8 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 10, 1995). Article I of the ICTY
Statute limits the tribunal's power to prosecuting "serious violations of international humanitarian
law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991." ICTY Statute, supra note 17,
art. 1, at 5.
60. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94- I-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Inter-
locutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, T 14 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
61. Id.
62. Id.
1560 [Vol. 109:1551
exercise of a court's functioning. Consequently, the tribunal concluded that
it possessed an inherent power to examine the legality of its own establish-
ment.6
Once the Tadic bench established that it possessed the inherent power to
determine the propriety of its own founding, the ICTY then applied this
power to a number of different contexts, including the formulation of sen-
tencing guidelines and the termination of defense counsel." Even though
the ICTY granted itself broad discretion in the use of inherent powers over
such areas, the judges have acknowledged elsewhere that the power cannot
67be used to enact measures that contravene principles of international law.
In the area of contempt, the Tadic Appeals Chamber concluded that it
had the inherent power to compel a witness to testify, relying on the theory
that such a power is necessary for carrying out its judicial functions and
safeguarding the administration of justice.' However, in the contempt pro-
ceedings against Dugko Tadic's lawyer, Milan Vujin, the Tadic Appeals
Chamber asserted a different and more expansive justification for inherent
powers. Rather than claiming that these powers arose from judicial neces-
sity, as it did in the Tadic jurisdiction case69 and the Tadic decision on
compelled witness testimony,'0 the same Appeals Chamber in the contempt
prosecution of Vujin asserted that its inherent power flowed from its mere
existence as a judicial body. 7' The court again emphasized this position in
63. Id. 9118 (internal quotation marks omitted).
64. Id. 22.
65. Facing the issue whether judicial discretion was appropriate in formulating minimum
sentencing guidelines when the ITCY Statute and RPE did not provide for such discretion, the Tadic
appeals bench concluded that judicial discretion to recommend minimum sentences "flows from the
powers inherent in its judicial function and does not amount to a departure from the Statute and
Rules." Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A & IT-94-1 -A bis, Judgement in Sentencing Appeals,
1 28 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 26, 2000).
66. In Prosecutor v. Delalic, the Trial Chamber decided it was appropriate to decide on a
motion to terminate counsel, asserting that it could use its inherent power to control a fair and expe-
ditious trial and to ensure the execution of justice. Case No. IT-96-2 1 -A, Order on the Motion to
Withdraw as Counsel Due to Conflict of Interest (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June
24, 1999).
67. For instance, the tribunal concluded that it did not have legal authority to issue subpoe-
nas to states because this would run afoul of international law principles that allow only states to
issue countermeasures against states. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-ARIO8 bis, Judge-
ment on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of
18 July 1997, 125 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 29, 1997). Similarly, in Prose-
cutor v. Simic the Trial Chamber concluded that it could not compel a Red Cross employee to
disclose information obtained during the course of his employment because of the customary norm
of international law allowing nondisclosure from Red Cross employees. Case No. IT-95-9-PT, Deci-
sion on the Prosecution Motion Under Rule 73 for a Ruling Concerning the Testimony of a Witness,
174 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 27, 1999).
68. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94- I-A, Judgement, 1322 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).
69. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
70. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
71. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A-R77, Judgment on Allegations of Contempt
Against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin, 9 28 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 31, 2000).
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the contempt prosecution of Florence Hartmann, where it stated that the
tribunal's inherent power to prosecute and punish contempt is "firmly estab-
lished" and derives from the tribunal's judicial power to ensure that it is not
frustrated in the exercise of its basic judicial functions under the ICTY Stat-
ute.72
These opinions suggest that inherent powers may be used only to protect
expressly conferred judicial functions. However, because the Vujin contempt
opinion indicates that the employment of inherent powers is not contingent
upon the powers delegated by the ICTY Statute, the Appeals Chamber
73granted itself much broader inherent powers.
While the ICTY has expansively interpreted the reach of its inherent
powers in contempt proceedings, the ICTR has been more cautious in apply-
ing its inherent powers to contempt allegations.74 In Prosecutor v.
Nyiramasuhuko, the ICTR Trial Chamber concluded that the Office of the
Prosecutor possessed the power to prosecute contempt even though its stat-
ute did not confer the prosecutor with such authority.75 Despite the court's
expansive interpretation of the contempt power, it couched its conclusion
in statutory, rather than inherent, terms, demonstrating its preference for the
narrow application of inherent powers.
The Nyiramasuhuko court concluded that the power of the prosecutor
"needs to be construed in light of the Tribunal's statutory jurisdiction with
respect to contempt."7 Even though the ICTR Trial Chamber acknowledged
that the Vujin contempt decision from the ICTY Appeals Chamber was dis-
72. Case Against Florence Hartmann, Case No. IT-02-54-R77.5, Judgement on Allegations
of Contempt, 18 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 14, 2009).
73. In an analysis of the Nuclear Tests case, Chester Brown notes that the ICJ asserted two
contradictory sources of inherent jurisdiction. Brown, supra note 57, at 223. First, the ICJ stated that
its inherent power flows from the "mere existence of the Court as a judicial organ." Id. (quoting
Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 23 (Dec. 20)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
This suggests that the court possesses the power without the external delegation of any powers. Id.
Second, the ICJ claimed that its inherent power exists in order to protect "its basic judicial func-
tions," suggesting that inherent jurisdiction is limited to safeguarding expressly conferred powers
and functions. Id. (quoting Nuclear Tests, 1974 I.C.J. 23) (internal quotation marks omitted).
74. See Shahram Dana, Commentary, The Law of Contempt before the UN ICTR, in 10 AN-
NOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 2001-2002 278, 283 (Andr6 Klip & Goran Sluiter eds., 2006)
(explaining that ICTR judges prudentially exercise their broad discretion over contempt proceed-
ings, recognizing that such a finding seriously affects the basic rights of the accused contemnor).
75. The Office of the Prosecutor claimed that it did not possess the authority to investigate
contempt because its power was limited to Article 15.1 of the ICTR Statute, which states that "[t]he
Prosecutor shall be responsible for the investigation and prosecution of persons responsible for
serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and
Rwandan citizens responsible for such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring States,
between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994." Nyiramasuhuko Contempt Decision 6, cited in
Dana, supra note 74, at 282.
76. Nyiramasuhuko Contempt Decision 8 (stating that parties before the court are not
empowered to investigate contempt but have an affirmative duty to do so), cited in Dana, supra note
74, at 282.
77. See Dana, supra note 74, at 282.
78. Nyiramasuhuko Contempt Decision 7, cited in Dana, supra note 74, at 282.
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positive and authorized the use of inherent powers in contempt proceed-
ings, 9 the ICTR bench still chose to contextualize the justification of
expanded powers in statutory, rather than inherent, powers.so
The hesitancy of the ICTR to rely on its inherent powers is remarkable,
especially in contrast to the more liberal approach of its sister tribunal. As one
commentator notes, "It is quite puzzling why the [ICTR in Nyiramasuhuko]
characterizes its jurisdiction over contempt as 'statutory' rather than 'inher-
ent'" when the statute is silent on contempt and the Chambers recognized the
availability of inherent powers under the Vujin contempt decision.'
Thus, both tribunals have demonstrated their ability to limit the use of in-
herent power. The ICTR's prudent approach to the inherent-powers doctrine
reflects its patterned policy of cautiously applying its inherent power. Even
though its conservative application of the inherent-powers doctrine is guided
by a tradition of prudence rather than a textual prohibition, because the ICTR
explains its use of power in statutory rather than inherent terms, the text of the
ICTR's constitutive documents circumscribes the exercise of power by the
tribunal. The ICTY has similarly limited the use of its inherent powers. Even
though the court has proffered different, arguably contradictory, justifications
for the employment of its inherent powers, the ICTY's acknowledgement that
82it lacks the inherent power to issue subpoenas against states and that it can-
not compel testimony from Red Cross employees demonstrates that the
ICTY is also capable of limiting the exercise of its inherent powers.
Even though the two tribunals exercise their inherent powers on a differ-
ent scale, both tribunals are competent not only to limit their use of power
but also to appropriately conscribe their use of power consistent with inter-
national norms on the use of inherent powers. On one level, the scope of the
Tribunals' inherent powers remains contested in both judicial decisions8 and
academic literature. Despite this ongoing debate, most scholars and jurists
79. Id.
80. Id.; see Dana, supra note 74, at 282.
81. Dana, supra note 74, at 282.
82. See Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-AR108 bis, Judgement on the Request of
the Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber 11 of 18 July 1997, 125 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 29, 1997).
83. See Prosecutor v. Simic, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, Decision on the Prosecution Motion Un-
der Rule 73 for a Ruling Concerning the Testimony of a Witness, 174 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia July 27, 1999).
84. Despite the ICJ's expansive endorsement of the inherent-powers doctrine in Nuclear
Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 23 (Dec. 20), a number of ICJ judges remain concerned about
the limits of its application. Judge Mohamed Shahabuddeen has explained that powers may exist
that are not explicit, but they "do not float around at large." Land, Island and Maritime Frontier
Dispute (El Sal./Hond.), 1990 I.C.J. 3, 41 (Feb. 28) (Shahabuddeen, J., dissenting). In another dis-
senting opinion from the ICJ, Judge Green Haywood Hackworth stated that "[p]owers not expressed
cannot freely be implied." Reparation for Injuries Suffered in Service of United Nations, Advisory
Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 198 (Apr. 11) (Hackworth, J., dissenting).
85. Paola Gaeta emphasizes that the exercise of power in international law is based on the
consent of states. Consequently, the Tribunals do not possess inherent powers as a result of their
judicial existence; rather they only hold the powers that were expressly granted to them by their
constitutive documents. Gaeta, supra note 56, at 368. However, Buteau and Oosthuizen explain that
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agree that the use of inherent powers is prohibited in two circumstances: the
Tribunals may not use inherent powers when the use would contravene the
spirit 6 or letter" of their constitutive instruments or the principles of interna-
tional law.' Neither the ICTY nor the ICTR has applied its inherent powers
in any of these proscribed manners, demonstrating that, even though the
ICTR is more cautious than the ICTY in its use of inherent powers, both
tribunals competently conscribe the exercise of their inherent powers.
First, the exercise of inherent powers in the ICTY and ICTR is not im-
plicitly or explicitly inconsistent with their constitutive instruments.
Neither statute prohibits the use of inherent powers.9 Despite its relatively
expansive use of its inherent powers, the ICTY shows caution and deference
for the spirit of its statute and RPE when deciding to use these powers. For
example, when deciding whether judicial discretion was appropriate in for-
mulating minimum sentencing guidelines, the Tadic Appeals Chamber
explained that it would not use its inherent powers when such an exercise
would "amount to a departure from the Statute and Rules."9' Second, the
ICTY has also conformed to the ban on the use of inherent powers by de-
clining to employ its inherent powers when their use would contravene
principles of international law, as illustrated in Prosecutor v. Blaskic9 and
Prosecutor v. Simic.' ICTR jurisprudence demonstrates a "common theme"
of restraint and "deliberate caution" when considering its inherent and statu-
tory powers to adjudicate contempt.9 4 Accordingly, even though the ICTY
the Tribunals have relatively rudimentary constitutive instruments because political realities pre-
vented the Security Council from detailing the exact powers of the Tribunals. Consequently, it
stands to reason that judges should be able to employ powers that promote the effective functioning
of the Tribunal, whether or not those powers are explicit in their underdeveloped statutes. Buteau
and Oosthuizen, supra note 5, at 81.
86. Brown, supra note 57, at 239 (stating that an international tribunal is not permitted to use
inherent powers when the exercise of such powers would be inconsistent with the principles and
procedures of its constitutive instrument).
87. Id. (stating that an international court is not permitted to use inherent powers when its
constitutive instrument explicitly prohibits the use of such powers).
88. Id. at 240 (clarifying that even when an international court's constitutive instrument does
not expressly forbid the use of inherent powers, the exercise of inherent powers would nonetheless
be inconsistent with the instrument or rules).
89. Id.
90. When a court's constitutive instrument expressly forbids the use of inherent powers, the
inherent powers of the court are displaced. In Notebohm, the ICJ concluded that the inherent pow-
ers of an international tribunal exist only "in the absence of any agreement to the contrary."
Preliminary Objection (Liech. v. Guat.), 1953 I.C.J. 111, 119 (Nov. 18).
91. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A & IT-94-1-A bis, Judgement in Sentencing
Appeals, 28 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 26, 2000).
92. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-AR108 bis, Judgement on the Request of the
Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997, 25 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 29, 1997).
93. Case No. IT-95-9-PT, Decision on the Prosecution Motion Under Rule 73 for a Ruling
Concerning the Testimony of a Witness, 74 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 27,
1999).
94. Dana, supra note 74, at 278.
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uses its inherent powers more broadly than the ICTR, neither court has
transgressed the two primary prohibitions on the use of inherent powers.
III. THE INHERENT-POWERS DOCTRINE AND CONTEMPTUOUS
CONDUCT SANCTIONS
While the Tribunals' power to promulgate procedural rules governing
the prosecution of contempt is grounded in the inherent powers of the
courts, the principle of legality requires that the judges codify these rules so
that potential contempt defendants have prospective notice of forbidden con-
duct. Punishment of conduct not explicitly classified as prohibited would
violate fundamental human rights and the due process principle of legality,
which mandates that a person may only be held criminally liable for acts
that constituted a crime at the time they were committed. 5 The principle of
legality is rooted in the protection of individuals against capricious govern-
ment power;9 it is "the citizen's bulwark against the State's omnipotence."97
The Tribunals' compliance with the principle of legality is of vital im-
portance because it is considered a fundamental human right and an
essential principle of international criminal-procedure law. Several core hu-
man rights treaties mandate compliance with this principle, 98 including the
Third99 and Fourth'" Geneva Conventions, the European Convention on
Human Rights,' and the American Convention on Human Rights.102 The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR")1 03 and the International
95. See, e.g., Sluiter, supra note 6, at 634.
96. Id. In contrast to the principle of legality, some criminal law systems are grounded on the
concept of substantive justice, where the legal order focuses primarily on prohibiting and punishing
harmful or dangerous conduct whether or not that behavior was criminalized at the moment it oc-
curred. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 36 (2d ed. 2008). This approach favors
the protection of society over the individual. Id. Professor Cassese states that "for a long period, and
until recently, international law has applied the doctrine of substantive justice, and it is only in re-
cent years that it is gradually replacing it with the doctrine of strict legality . . . ." Id. at 38-39.
97. Franz von Liszt, Die deterministischen Gegner der Zweckstrafe [Deterministic Oppo-
nents of Purposive Punishment], 13 DIE GESAMTE STRAFRECHTSWISSENSHCAFT 325 (1983), as
reprinted and translated in 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1009, 1010 (2007). Note, however, that until
recently, international law applied the doctrine of substantive justice not because of an authoritarian
streak in the international community but because states had not yet formulated treaties establishing
criminal rules and customary rules had not yet evolved. CASSESE, supra note 96, at 39.
98. CASSESE, supra note 96, at 40.
99. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 99, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3316,75 U.N.T.S. 135.
100. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 67,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
101. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 7(1),
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
102. American Convention on Human Rights: "Pact of San Jos6, Costa Rica" art. 9, Nov. 22,
1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 144.
103. Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 11(2), G.A. Res. 217(B)A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(111) (Dec. 10, 1948) ("No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR")'04 also require adherence
to the legality principle. As the rights afforded to criminal defendants were
both codified and expanded through the proliferation of international trea-
ties, including the 1948 Convention on Genocide, the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, and the 1984 Convention on Torture, the rights flowing from
the principle of legality became embedded in international criminal law.05
The principle is implicitly required by the ICTY and ICTR'0 and expressly
articulated in Article 22 of the Rome Statute.'07 Although the international
community is ostensibly committed to the principle of legality, the Tribunals
have failed to adhere to this fundamental principle in the practice of adjudi-
cating contempt.
The ICTY has taken a relaxed stance on enforcement of the principle of
legality.'o Rather than looking to the precise text available at the time that
the crime was committed, the tribunal looks to the much looser standard of
foreseeability and accessibility of the law.'0 The ICTY Appeals Chamber
has explained:
As to foreseeability, the conduct in question is the concrete conduct of the
accused; he must be able to appreciate that the conduct is criminal in the
sense generally understood, without reference to any specific provision. As
to accessibility, in the case of an international tribunal such as this, acces-
any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at
the time when it was committed.").
104. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 15(1), adopted on Dec. 19,
1966, S. TREATY Doc. No. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 ("No one shall be held guilty of any criminal
offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under na-
tional or international law, at the time when it was committed.").
105. CASSESE, supra note 96, at 40-41.
106. See U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of
Security Council Resolution 808, 29, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993) [hereinafter Rep. of the
U.N. Secretary-General]. Cassese explains that the principle of legality was established through the
development of human rights treaties and through the growth of international criminal law on ac-
count of the accumulation of case law from the ICTY and ICTR. CASSESE, supra note 96, at 40-41;
OLAOLUWA OLUSNYA, RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: THE SUBSTANTIVE PART 41
(2007).
107. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 22, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90. The Rome Statute is the treaty that establishes the International Criminal Court ("ICC"). Id. art.
1. Article 22 of the Rome Statute, entitled "Nullum crimen sine lege," states:
1. A person shall not be criminally responsible under this Statute unless the conduct in
question constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the
Court.
2. The definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended by anal-
ogy. In case of ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in favour of the person
being investigated, prosecuted or convicted.
3. This article shall not affect the characterization of any conduct as criminal under interna-
tional law independently of this Statute.
Id. art. 22.
108. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE UN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA, RWANDA AND SIERRA LEONE 63 (2006).
109. Id.
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sibility does not exclude reliance being placed on a law which is based on
custom."0
The ICTY's approach to the principle of legality is relatively casual be-
cause the court typically applies the principle to substantive crimes rather
than to procedural violations."' But applying the foreseeability and accessi-
bility standard to procedural offenses jeopardizes legal certainty because
there is "no evidence as to the existence and content of procedural offences
under international law."' This means potential contemnors will lack
knowledge of what conduct the tribunal may decide to punish through its
* 113inherent powers.
The ICTY judges made the scope of prohibited conduct more ambigu-
ous by amending Rule 77 to grant the tribunal the power to prosecute and
punish any supposed contempt offense under its inherent powers, changing
the formerly particularized contempt offense into a hazy, ill-defined viola-
tion. Prior to November 1997, ICTY RPE Rule 77 granted contempt power
over individuals who committed specific offenses, such as refusal to testify,
interference with witnesses or other persons, or illegal disclosure of infor-
mation." 4 The judges then amended the introductory sentence of Rule 77 to
read, "The Tribunal in the exercise of its inherent power may hold in con-
tempt those who knowingly and wilfully interfere with its administration of
justice . . . .""' This transformed the formerly exhaustive list of offenses to
mere examples of actions that fall under the court's inherent jurisdiction,
allowing for the prosecution and punishment of conduct that is not explicitly
defined.
The Vujin contempt decisions 6 illustrate this inconsistency with the
principle of legality. Some of Vujin's conduct was prohibited by explicit
provisions in the RPE: Rule 77 prohibited "interfere[nce] with, [sic] a wit-
ness,""7 and Vujin was accused of bribing, instructing, and intimidating
110. Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Decision on Interlocutory Ap-
peal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility, 34 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia July 16, 2003) (citation omitted).
111. See Sluiter, supra note 6, at 635.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See Int'l Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
Int'l Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia since 1991, Rules of Pro-
cedure and Evidence, r. 77, at 51-52, U.N Doc. IT/32/Rev. 11 (July 25, 1997).
115. Int'l Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of Int'l
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, Rules of Pro-
cedure and Evidence, r. 77(A), at 81, U.N Doc. IT/32/Rev. 24 (Aug. 5, 2002).
116. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A-R77, Appeal Judgement on Allegations of Con-
tempt Against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 27,
2001); Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A-R77, Judgment on Allegations of Contempt Against
Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 31, 2000).
117. Int'l Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of Int'l
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, Rules of Pro-
cedure and Evidence, r. 77(B), at 72, U.N Doc. IT/32/Rev. 17 (Dec. 7, 1999) [hereinafter ICTY RPE
as Amended Dec. 7, 1999].
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witnesses to lie."' However, Vujin was also found in contempt for behavior
not proscribed by the RPE. For example, he gave a list of potential defense
witnesses to a municipal police chief,"9 an infraction that might have been
due to inexperience rather than conscious violation of Rule 77. Even though
Rule 77 requires the violation to be "knowing[] and willfull],, 20 the Tribu-
nal relied on its inherent powers to prosecute arguably negligent conduct."2
The Vujin bench held that it had the inherent power to punish contempt in
order to ensure the exercise of its jurisdiction and safeguard its fundamental
judicial functions, whether or not the specific conduct was explicitly prohib-
ited in Rule 77.122
Recognizing that Vujin's conduct was not expressly banned, the Ap-
peals Chamber asserted that it was empowered to prosecute his behavior
because it violated the "immutable standard of conduct required for the Tri-
bunal's proper functioning."' 24 If the immutable standard was not established
or made public, however, then the conduct is not properly punishable-a
notice requirement is embedded in the principle of legality. 12 Vujin argued
that these norms were not fully publicized at the time of his alleged conduct
and that his behavior was improperly judged according to undeveloped
criminal norms.126
Uncertainty about the scope and content of the immutable standard of
conduct is inevitable in the context of the Tribunals' contempt jurisprudence,
where the behavioral customs are nascent and scarce. Defense attorneys
who are experienced in domestic law may be unfamiliar with the unwritten
code of conduct in conflict and postconflict situations and may need to ref-
erence expressly articulated codes of conduct. For example, in a typical
domestic court, a common sense approach would posit that a trial lawyer
should not disclose a confidential witness list. However, in the complex and
politically thorny endeavor of defending a war criminal, an inexperienced
118. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A-R77, Judgment on Allegations of Contempt Against Prior
Counsel, Milan Vujin, 2.
119. Id. V 95-100.
120. ICTY RPE as Amended Dec. 7, 1999, supra note 117, r. 77(E), at 73.
121. James Cockayne, Commentary, in 4 ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
1999-2000 191 (Andr6 Klip & Goran Sluiter eds., 2002); cf Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-
95-14/I-T, Finding of Contempt of the Tribunal (Dec. 11, 1998) (clarifying that Rule 77 covers not
only deliberate violations, but also deliberate failures to ascertain the factual circumstances sur-
rounding a witness protection order).
122. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A-R77, Judgment on Allegations of Contempt Against Prior
Counsel, Milan Vujin, 13, 18.
123. Id. 13.
124. Cockayne, supra note 121, at 196-97 (citing Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A-R77, Judgment
on Allegations of Contempt Against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin, 28-29).
125. See Cockayne, supra note 121, at 197.
126. Id. at 196 (discussing Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A-R77, Judgment on Allegations of Con-
tempt Against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin).
127. See id. at 197.
1568 [Vol. 109:1551
Infusing Due Process
lawyer before the ICTY or ICTR might reasonably provide the police with a
witness list for fear of the witnesses' safety without perceiving that she was
interfering with the administration of justice.
The Appeals Chamber ultimately found Vujin guilty of violations of the
immutable standard of conduct.128 Inconsistencies with the principle of le-
gality did not appear to factor in the decision. The outcome is partially
explained in Judge Wald's dissent from the finding of jurisdiction, in which
she stated that "various [written and well-established] procedural safe-
121guards" do not apply to contempt proceedings. Judge Wald did not
elaborate on why accused contemnors were not entitled to such procedural
protections. This is especially conspicuous because the ICTY unambigu-
ously stated in Blaskicso and Simic"' that inherent powers may not
contravene general principles of international law, including the principle of
legality.
During the drafting of the ICTY Statute, the UN Secretary-General was
particularly sensitive to compliance with the principle of legality, stating
that "the application of the principle [of legality] requires that the interna-
tional tribunal should apply rules of international humanitarian law which
are beyond any doubt part of customary law."13 2 Because the relatively nas-
cent and imprecise content of international criminal-procedure law has
frustrated its development as customary law,13 potential contemnors may
not be aware of the unwritten immutable standard of conduct. Therefore, to
avoid running afoul of the principle of legality, the Tribunals should only
prosecute conduct that has been codified as prohibited.
IV. THE PROHIBITION ON CREATING CRIMINAL OFFENSES AND THE DEARTH
OF DUE PROCESS IN NOMINALLY NONCRIMINAL CASES:
APPLYING THE ELDRIDGE SOLUTION
Although the Tribunals possess statutory and inherent powers to prom-
ulgate procedural rules governing contempt proceedings and to prosecute
infractions, the judges are not empowered to employ inherent powers to
128. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A-AR77, Appeal Judgement on Allegations of
Contempt Against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 27,
2001).
129. Id. (Wald, J., dissenting) (finding that neither the ICTY Statute nor the Rules of Proce-
dure and Evidence granted jurisdiction to the Appeals Chamber). The majority opinion was silent on
the principle of legality. Id. (majority opinion). While Judge Wald agreed with the majority's judg-
ment, she wrote separately to explain that various procedural safeguards are not needed in contempt
proceedings. Id. (Wald, J., dissenting).
130. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-AR108 bis, Judgement on the Request of the
Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber H of 18 July 1997, [25 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 29, 1997).
131. Prosecutor v. Simic, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, Decision on the Prosecution Motion Under
Rule 73 for a Ruling Concerning the Testimony of a Witness, [74 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia July 27, 1999).
132. Rep. of the U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 106,1 34.
133. See Sluiter, supra note 6, at 635; see also, e.g., CRYER ET AL., supra note 1, at 12.
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define and punish contempt as a criminal offense. As a result, judges may be
disguising criminal offenses as administrative infractions to conceal ultra
vires creation of criminal offenses.'" Section IV.A recognizes that the Tribu-
nals have the power to create procedural rules for contempt proceedings but
argues that the Tribunals' definition and punishment of criminal contempt is
an ultra vires exercise of power.' Section IV.B argues that, even if con-
tempt proceedings are deemed noncriminal, a higher level of procedural
protection must be afforded to contempt defendants since they face substan-
tial liberty and property deprivations.
A. Permissible Promulgation of Procedural Rules Versus
Prohibited Legislation of Criminal Offenses
The Security Council empowered the ICTY with the enforcement of ex-
isting law and did not intend for the ICTY to enact new law.' In his report
to the Security Council regarding the establishment of the ICTY, the UN
Secretary-General emphasized that "in assigning to the International Tribu-
nal the task of prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of
international humanitarian law, the Security Council would not be creating
or purporting to 'legislate' that law. Rather, the International Tribunal would
have the task of applying existing international humanitarian law."' As
noted by the Tadic appeals bench, "it is open to the Security Council ... to
adopt definitions of crimes in the Statute ....
Recognizing this distinction, the Tadic Appeals Chamber emphasized
that Article 15 of the ICTY Statute gives judges the authority to promulgate
procedural rules consistent with the court's inherent powers but does not
permit the tribunal to establish new offenses.3 In the Vujin contempt deci-
sion, the Appeals Chamber recognized this problem and attempted to
resolve it by stating that "[c]are must be taken not to treat the considerable
amount of elaboration which has occurred in relation to Rule 77 over the
years as if it has produced a statutory form of offence enacted by the judges
of the Tribunal."140 The Chamber continued:
Article 15 of the Tribunal's Statute gives power to the judges to adopt only
... rules of procedure and evidence .... That power does not permit rules
to be adopted which constitute new offences, but it does permit the judges
134. See Mundis, supra note 24, at 220 (explaining that the Tribunals' rules may impermissi-
bly criminalize conduct that is not provided for in their statutes); O'Shea, supra note 5 (explaining
that the frequent amendment of the Tribunals' rules abuse the procedural rights of defendants).
135. See Sluiter, supra note 6, at 633-34.
136. SCHABAS, supra note 108, at 63.
137. Rep. of the U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 106, 1 29.
138. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1 -A, Judgement, 296 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) (emphasis added).
139. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A-R77, Judgment on Allegations of Contempt
Against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin, 24 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 31, 2000).
140. Id.
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to adopt rules of procedure and evidence for the conduct of matters falling
within the inherent jurisdiction of the Tribunal as well as matters within its
statutory jurisdiction.'
Not surprisingly, the line between promulgating rules with sanctions and
creating criminal offenses is imprecise. In fact, in Nyiramasuhuko, the ICTR
stated outright that "contempt is by its very nature a criminal charge."l 42 Mi-
chael Bohlander, an experienced ICTY practitioner, concludes that because
Rule 77 prescribes such serious penalties, "[t]here should be no debate" that
it creates a criminal offense rather than an administrative sanction. 43
Precedent from the European Court of Human Rights ("ECHR") sup-
ports Bohlander's contention that attaching severe penalties to a contempt
finding transforms an administrative contempt proceeding into the adjudica-
tion of a criminal offense.'" In Weber v. Switzerland 45 and Benham v. United
Kingdom,146 the ECHR concluded that when contempt sanctions are substan-
tial, particularly when they involve the loss of liberty, contempt proceedings
are properly characterized as criminal. 147 However, other cases from the
ECHR, including Ravnsborg v. Sweden 48 and Putz v. Austria,149 suggest that
when the purpose of the contempt proceeding is "principally directed at
maintaining the order and dignity of the [judicial process],"' the contempt
proceeding will be considered to be administrative rather than criminal."'
Following this distinction, mere administrative proceedings would not
give rise to severe punitive sanctions, meaning a line might be drawn be-
tween permissible administrative hearings and prohibited criminal
141. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting ICTY Statute, supra note 17, art. 15, at 10) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
142. Nyiramasuhuko Contempt Decision, cited in Dana, supra note 74, at 282.
143. Bohlander, supra note 41, at 92 n.6. Indeed, both courts impose harsh punishments for
contempt violations. ICTY RPE Rule 77(G) allows for 7 years of imprisonment, a fine of E100,000,
or both as a punishment for contempt. ICTY RPE, supra note 18, r. 77(G), at 82. Similarly, ICTR
RPE Rule 77(G) calls for up to 5 years imprisonment, a fine of $10,000, or both as punishment for
contempt. ICTR RPE, supra note 18, r. 77(G), at 93. While 7-10 years of imprisonment may rea-
sonably be viewed as an outrageous consequence for a disciplinary infraction, the law of
international criminal procedure provides little guidance in determining the threshold punishment
that transforms an administrative hearing into a criminal proceeding. See Gane, supra note 5, at 240
("[Tlhe question [when contempt proceedings are criminal hearings that must give rise to a special
host of due process protections] has not, as such, been addressed by the Tribunal . . . .").
144. Because the ICTR and ICTY have not addressed when the contempt proceedings might
be labeled as administrative and the ICC employs decentralized contempt proceedings, the ECHR is
a primary source of case law on the subject.
145. Weber v. Switzerland, App. No. 11034184, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 508 (1990).
146. Benham v. United Kingdom, App. No. 19380/92, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 293 (1996).
147. Gane, supra note 5, at 240 (explaining that the ECHR has also looked to the nature of the
conduct in question as a factor in considering whether the proceeding is criminal); see also Engel v.
Netherlands, Application 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 647, fi[ 81-82 (1976).
148. Ravnsborg v. Sweden, App. No. 14220/88, 18 Eur. H.R. Rep. 38, 45-48 (1994).
149. Putz v. Austria, App. No. 18892/91, 32 Eur. H.R. Rep. 13 (1996).
150. Gane, supra note 5, at 240.
151. Id.
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proceedings by severity of the punishment.152 Under this theory, even if it
were possible for a severe punitive sanction to be "principally directed at
maintaining the order and dignity of [the judicial process],"' the ICTY and
ICTR could not inflict severe sanctions for contempt and also maintain the
jurisdictional mandate proscribing the creation of criminal offenses because
a serious penalty would cause a proceeding to become criminal in nature.15 4
However, this paradigm is deeply problematic because it is possible to
distinguish between criminal and noncriminal proceedings only after the
attachment of penalties. Accordingly, it is impossible to know in advance of
the hearing whether the proceeding will be criminal or administrative. Yet
because higher levels of procedural protection attach in criminal hearings,
it is critical that the tribunal identify the nature of the proceeding before the
trial begins.
Currently, the ICTY does not formally consider whether its contempt
proceedings are criminal as a preliminary matter, because it considers all
contempt proceedings to be administrative even when the imposition of se-
rious sanctions may mean the proceedings are functionally criminal.17 As a
result, imposition of serious sanctions may not only be ultra vires, but may
also violate the accused's due process and human rights guarantees.
If a contempt proceeding were criminal rather than administrative, the
tribunal would be required to respect the "internationally recognized stan-
dards regarding the rights of the accused,"11 which includes the criminal
trial protections afforded by a number of international instruments. 159 The
ICCPR requires that defendants receive a fair trial before an independent
tribunal.' Likewise, the UDHR, the American Convention on Human
152. See id.
153. Id.
154. Mundis, supra note 24, at 220-21; see also Klip, supra note 42, at 276-77 (arguing that
Rule 77 "is beyond the powers of the judges of the Tribunal and does neither legally bind individu-
als nor states" and that Rule 91 is similarly "not binding, being beyond the mandate given to the
judges under Article 15 of the Statute").
155. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 104, art. 14(1).
156. See Gane, supra note 5, at 239-40.
157. Id.
158. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A-AR77, Appeal Judgement on Allegations of
Contempt Against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin, at 3 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb.
27, 2001) (quoting Rep. of the U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 106, [ 106) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
159. See, e.g., Rogerson v. Australia, U.N. Doe. CCPR/Cf74/802/199/1998 (U.N.H.R. Comm.
Apr. 3, 1996) (concluding that criminal proceedings under Australian law fall within the dictates of
Article 14 of the ICCPR).
160. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 104, art. 14(1) (afford-
ing the right "[i]n the determination of any criminal charge" to a "fair and public hearing by a
competent, independent, and impartial tribunal established by law").
161. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 103, art. 10 ("Everyone is entitled
... to a fair ... hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal . . . ").
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Rights, and the European Convention on Human Rights all mandate that
criminal defendants have the right to a fair trial before an impartial tribunal.
Taken together, a host of procedural protections are afforded to a defendant
in a criminal trial that are not extended to an accused in a noncriminal con-
tempt proceeding, including an independent and impartial trial; the
presumption of innocence; a public, fair, and expeditious proceeding;'6 and
the opportunity to confront adverse witnesses.
The current paradigm for affording process in contempt hearings before
the Tribunals is unsatisfactory because accused contemnors face serious
property and liberty deprivations yet are denied procedural protections that
would accompany similar punishments in a criminal trial. The method that
distinguishes criminal proceedings from noncriminal proceedings based on
the severity of the imposed sanction is flawed because the Tribunals cannot
determine the severity of the sanction before the proceeding takes place. As
a result, the Tribunals afford inadequate procedural protection to the accused
contemnor, leaving the defendant vulnerable to situations such as contempt
trials in absentia'" and contempt hearings without the possibility of ap-
peal.1
B. Applying Eldridge to Nominally Noncriminal Cases
It is critical that the Tribunals employ the appropriate standards of due
process in contempt proceedings; yet, for two reasons, forcing the court to
draw a bright-line distinction between criminal and noncriminal contempt
proceedings risks a scheme where criminal defendants are given either vig-
orous or scarce procedural protection. First, a judge on the ICTY or ICTR
may be hesitant to candidly identify contempt proceedings as criminal when
this classification would require her to relinquish jurisdiction over the very
cases of conduct that insult and frustrate her court. Second, the binary un-
derstanding of a proceeding as criminal or noncriminal may lead to
162. American Convention on Human Rights: "Pact of San Jos6, Costa Rica," supra note 102,
art. 8(1) ("Every person has the right to a hearing .. . by a competent, independent, and impartial
tribunal . . . .").
163. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note
101, art. 6(1).
164. CRYER ET AL., supra note 1, at 353-58.
165. Gane, supra note 5, at 242.
166. ICTY RPE Rule 77(F) allows for contempt hearings to be conducted in the absence of
the accused contemnor. Cockayne, supra note 121, at 199. A contempt trial was conducted in absen-
tia in the Blaskic case. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-ARIO8 bis, Judgement on the
Request of the Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997,
59 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 29, 1997).
167. ICTY RPE Rule 77(J) only provides for appeals from decisions rendered by the Trial
Chamber. Cockayne, supra note 121, at 199. When Vujin filed an appeal against the finding of con-
tempt by the Appeals Chamber, he was forced to rely on Article 14 of the ICCPR as a jurisdictional
basis for his appeal because there is no provision for such an approach in either the ICTY Statute or
the RPE. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94- 1 -A-AR77, Appeal Judgement on Allegations of
Contempt Against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin, at 4 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb.
27, 2001).
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underenforcement of due process rights for proceedings that fall just shy of
the criminal threshold.
Therefore, a bright-line rule demarcating administrative and criminal
contempt proceedings would either overenforce or underenforce procedural
protection for the cases at the margin. While this drawback accompanies the
operation of all bright-line rules, the impact is especially injurious in the
context of the Tribunals, where the international community is loath to af-
ford additional time and funding to the hearings for unwarranted process yet
insufficient procedural protection for accused contemnors may contravene
fair trial guarantees required by international human rights law. In response,
this Section proposes application of the balancing test in Mathews v. El-
dridge to calibrate procedural protection for accused contemnors.
The Tribunals lack a coherent, all-encompassing framework to deter-
mine due process for accused contemnors in Rule 77 proceedings."9
Recognizing that due process is "flexible and calls for such procedural pro-
tections as the particular situation demands,,170 the Tribunals should not
employ "a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place
and circumstances."' Instead of the current scheme, which affords process
based on the two categories of criminal or noncriminal proceedings, the Tri-
bunals should employ a context-specific, fact-bound approach.172
In Eldridge, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that a recipient of state-
provided disability payments did not have a Fourteenth Amendment due
process right to a pretermination hearing, even though the disability benefits
constituted a property interest.7 3 Eldridge was decided six years after Gold-
berg v. Kelly,14 which concluded that a welfare recipient is constitutionally
entitled to a pretermination hearing, primarily because the cessation of aid
might deprive an eligible recipient of the very means to live. The Eldridge
Court held that the U.S. Constitution required less procedural protection for
a disability beneficiary than a welfare recipient, reasoning that the termina-
tion of disability benefits does not necessarily impose the same hardship as
the cessation of welfare benefits because welfare recipients are per se desti-
tute while disability recipients are not categorically indigent. 1 The Eldridge
Court concluded that due process should correspond to the facts of each
168. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
169. See Gane, supra note 5, at 242 (describing the scattershot underenforcement of human
rights and due process protection in contempt proceedings).
170. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
171. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)
(quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
172. See Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319.
173. Id. at 349.
174. 397 U.S. 254, 267-68 (1970).
175. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 341-43.
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case. In its three-factor test, process is determined by the weight of the
private interest, the risk of error, and the governmental interest.'7
The Eldridge test would allow the Tribunals to consider procedural pro-
tection with principle and consistency while still balancing the exigencies of
each case. For example, the first factor is based on the idea that "the degree
of potential deprivation that may be created by a particular decision is a fac-
tor to be considered in assessing the validity of any administrative
decisionmaking process.""' The possible length of the wrongful deprivation
is also a relevant consideration."' An accused contemnor before the ICTR
faces up to five years imprisonment, a $10,000 fine, or both,'so and an ac-
cused contemnor before the ICTY may be imprisoned for seven years, fined
E100,000, or both.18 ' The severity of the possible deprivation suggests that, at
a minimum, alleged contemnors should be afforded the opportunity to be
heard at a meaningful time in a meaningful manner.182
The first Eldridge factor is especially relevant because, despite the sub-
stantial penalties prescribed by Rule 77, the Tribunals have not consistently
provided accused contemnors with a meaningful opportunity to be heard. In
Blaskic, for example, the Trial Chamber made a factual finding on a critical
question of the contempt issue, namely the knowledge of the accused con-
temnor, without allowing the accused contemnor to respond to that
allegation."' On the other hand, in Nyiramasuhuko, the ICTR demonstrated
"sensitivity to safeguard[ing] fundamental procedural rights."'" The Prose-
cution attempted to file an ex parte contempt motion alleging witness
tampering and the attempted theft of documents and arguing that witness
protection required an ex parte filing.'"' Considering "the gravity of the alle-
gations made," the court ordered the prosecution to immediately file the
motion inter partes so that the defense would have an opportunity to be
heard through written and oral submissions.' It is precisely the type of pro-
cedural caution in Nyiramasuhuko that the first factor of the Eldridge test
promotes.
176. Id. at 334.
177. Id. at 335.
178. Id. at 341; see also Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262-63.
179. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 341 (citing Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 389 (1975)).
180. ICTR RPE, supra note 18, r. 77(G), at 93.
181. ICTY RPE, supra note 18, r. 77(G), at 82.
182. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267. In the context of welfare deprivation, due process requires
timely and adequate notice explaining the reasons for proposed termination and the opportunity to
confront any adverse witness. Id. at 267-68.
183. Gane, supra note 5, at 242 (discussing Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14, Deci-
sion of Trial Chamber I on the Requests of the Prosecutor of 12 and 14 May 1997 in Respect of the
Protection of Witnesses (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 6, 1997)).
184. Dana, supra note 74, at 278.
185. Id. at 280.
186. Id.
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The second Eldridge factor considers the risk of erroneous deprivation,
which turns on "the fairness and reliability of the existing .. . procedures . . .
[and] the risk of error inherent in the truth-finding process."' In American
law, this factor evaluates the adequacy of the communicative method-
written submissions or oral testimony-as an effective means for a party to
convey information to the decisionmaker.' In ICTY and ICTR contempt
proceedings, this factor is particularly relevant because much of the evi-
dence may rely on contested testimony.'8 For example, in the Ntakirutimana
case before the ICTR, the Trial Chamber emphasized the importance of the
factual finding to the case and dismissed the contempt allegations resting on
contested oral testimony so as not to "unduly infringe on [the] fundamental
due process and fair trial rights of the defense."
The third Eldridge factor is the public interest, which includes the ad-
ministrative burden and other social costs associated with providing
additional procedural safeguards to accused contemnors.' 9 ' Because the Tri-
bunals are widely criticized for the time and expense they incur in
adjudicating proceedings,'92 critics who view the slow pace of the Tribunals
as an impediment to their effectiveness will not warmly greet the time and
expense of additional process. Nonetheless, the improprieties that flow from
due process violations threaten the integrity of the Tribunals' work because
they compromise international guarantees of impartiality and diminish the
perception of justice.193 Controversy over the violation of human and due
process rights within the Tribunals can prevent postconflict justice from
playing a cathartic role in community rebuilding.194 Because the effective
functioning of a court system requires justice to be executed in both percep-
tion and reality,' if judicial officers are seen as trampling on fair trial
187. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343-44 (1976).
188. Id. at 345.
189. See, e.g., Dana, supra note 74, at 279.
190. Id.
191. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 347.
192. Critics claim that "justice delayed is justice denied." See, e.g., Galbriath, The Pace of
International Criminal Justice, 31 MICH. J. INT'L L., 79, 80-81.
193. Cf John D. Ciorciari, Justice and Judicial Corruption, SEARCHING FOR TRUTH, Oct.
2007, http://www.cambodiatribunal.org/commentary/expert-commentary.html (scroll down to "Jus-
tice and Judicial Corruption"; then click on "English version").
194. See MARTHA MINow, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AF-
TER GENOCIDE AND MAsS VIOLENCE 12 (1998). In fact, bureaucratic and procedural controversies at
the ICTR have led Rwandans to perceive the court as a "useless institution." ICG, supra note 10, at
iii.
195. Ddsirie Bernard, Honourable Madame Justice, Caribbean Court of Justice, Address at the 14th
Commonwealth Law Conference: The Impact Of Corniption Within The Court System On Its Ability To
Administer Justice (Sept. 2005), available at http://www.caribbeancoustofjustice.org/speeches/bemard/04-
The%20Impact%20of%'20Corruption%20within%20the%20Court%20System.pdf
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rights, then society may accept the judicial outcomes as a sham-a "grave
insult" to the victims and survivors of mass human rights violations.'97
It may be argued that the Eldridge inquiry, a balancing test predicated on
the process afforded in administrative proceedings under the U.S. Constitu-
tion, is poorly equipped to govern contempt proceedings before the
Tribunals. However, even though international procedural law lacks a pre-
cise analogue to the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, caselaw from the Tribunals demonstrates that defendants be-
fore the ICTY and ICTR who face substantial property and liberty
deprivations are afforded a panoply of human and procedural rights, which,
taken together, guarantee that property or liberty may not be taken away
without some procedural protection. For example, while neither the ICTY
Statute nor the ICTY Statute explicitly references a habeas remedy, the
ICTR Appeals Chamber held in Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor that a detained
individual must have judicial recourse to challenge the legality of his deten-
tion.'98 This conclusion has been upheld by both the ICTY" and ICTR.2 0 In
Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, the ICTR concluded that violations of a defendant's
procedural rights may be challenged, including the right to be promptly in-
formed of the reason for detainment, the right to be promptly seen by a
judge, the right to be assisted by counsel, and the right to be present at the
proceeding.21 Even though differences remain between domestic and inter-
national law, the advantage of the Eldridge test is that it is adaptable to
"virtually any question of procedural adequacy."2 02
Criminal proceedings must always afford the due process protections
provided by international law, and the Tribunals' judges should never legis-
late criminal contempt offenses. Regardless of whether the contempt
proceedings are classified as administrative or criminal, the fact remains that
serious penalties may be imposed with scant procedural protection under the
Tribunals' current rules. As such, the Tribunals should adopt a flexible
model of due process to consider the unique procedural issues before the
ICTY and ICTR. The Eldridge test would provide a principled guideline for
the Tribunals to identify the appropriate standards of process to be afforded
in their contempt hearings.
196. See id.
197. See Ciorciari, supra note 193.
198. Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision, 1 88 (Nov. 3, 1999).
199. Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-PT, Decision on Petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus on Behalf of Radoslav Brdanin, 5 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 8,
1999).
200. Prosecutor v. Kanyabashi, Case No. ICTR-96-15-I, Decision on the Defence Extremely
Urgent Motion on Habeas Corpus and for Stoppage of Proceedings, 27 (May 23, 2000).
201. Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T, Judgment and Sentence, 251-53 (May 23, 2000).
202. JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAw SYSTEM
329 (6th ed. 2009).
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CONCLUSION
Two procedural defects undermine the legitimacy of contempt proceed-
ings before the ICTR and the ICTY: the violation of the principle of legality
and the failure to provide tailored procedural protection. First, to act in a
manner consistent with the principle of legality, the Tribunals should only
prosecute contemptuous conduct that has been proscribed in their respective
procedural rules. Rather than relying on the ill-defined immutable standard
of conduct that is contested in the nascent body of international criminal
procedure, the Tribunals should prospectively adopt rules prohibiting the
targeted behavior. Second, while the Tribunals may adopt procedural rules
governing contempt, they may neither legislate nor prosecute criminal con-
tempt offenses. Because international law prescribes a host of procedural
protections to criminal defendants but not to accused contemnors facing
administrative sanctions, the Tribunals should adopt the Eldridge test to es-
tablish principled guidelines for determining the process to be afforded to
each accused contemnor. Compliance with the principle of legality and em-
ployment of flexible due process standards will inject due process protection
into the Tribunals' contempt proceedings and consequently fortify the pro-
cedures governing international criminal law.
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